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THE NONEXCEPTIONALISM THESIS :
HOW POST-9/11 CRIMINAL JUSTICE MEASURES
FIT IN BROADER CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Francesca Laguardia*
Contrary to the assumption that ‘‘9/11 changed everything,’’ post-2001 criminal
justice practices in the area of terrorism show a surprising consistency with
pre-2001 criminal justice practices. This article relies on an analysis of over
300 terrorism prosecutions between 2001 and 2010, as well as twenty full trial
transcripts, content coding, and traditional legal analysis, to show the continu-
ity of criminal justice over this time in regard to some of the most controversial
supposed developments. This continuity belies the common assumption that
current extreme policies and limitations on due process are a panicked response
to the terror attacks of 2001. To the contrary, terrorism cases appear to have shed
light on the direction in which the United States was heading for decades.
Keywords: terrorism, surveillance, conspiracy, exceptionalism
I N TRODUCT ION
From the use of material support statutes to revelations regarding the extent
of National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance of metadata, the phrase
‘‘9/11 changed everything’’ has been ubiquitous in discussions of criminal
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justice since 2001. However, it is only recently that scholars and practi-
tioners have begun specifying the ways in which criminal justice suppos-
edly changed in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks.1
The idea that a single coordinated attack could result in such sudden
and decisive change is a stunning indictment, not only of current practices,
but also of the strength of legal professionalism, legal education, legal
process, and the supposed influence of legality and legal culture. The
possibility that even such a catastrophic event as the terrorist attacks of
2001 could completely undermine well-established norms and practices of
criminal justice should upend any faith we may have had in the processes
of the criminal justice system, their consistency, and possibly the rule of law
itself.
For this reason alone, those changes should be interrogated rather than
assumed. Is it true that prosecutors, faced with a new horror of the threat
posed by terrorists, ignored well-established norms in order to incarcerate
terror defendants? Is it true that legislators imagined new tools in the form
of criminal statutes, ignoring current understandings of First Amendment
doctrine, to enable that incarceration? Is it true that the fresh invasions into
privacy in the form of government surveillance performed by law enforce-
ment would have been unheard of but for the panicked response to the
twenty-first century’s introduction to the ‘‘new’’ terror threat? This article
will argue that it is not. Rather, post-2001 criminal justice practices in the
area of terrorism and criminal justice more generally show a surprising
consistency with pre-2001 criminal justice practices.
This article will not to argue that current practices align with the dem-
ocratic ideals of the United States. To the contrary, this article agrees, as
many critics of current policies have claimed, that these practices illustrate
a march toward tyranny that fundamentally contradicts many of the prin-
ciples we believe to be enshrined in our criminal constitutional law. More-
over, certain aspects of criminal justice are clearly changing, in part as
a response to the threat of terrorism (both prior to and since 2001). But
we give ourselves too much credit by believing that these practices are solely
the result of panic, or limited to the realm of terrorism. And by making this
mistake, we both rely on arguments that are doomed to failure (that such
1. E.g., Carol Bast & Cynthia Brown, A Contagion of Fear: Post-9/11 Alarm Expands
Executive Branch Authority and Sanctions Prosecutorial Exploitation of America’s Privacy, 13
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 361 (2015).
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practices are unprecedented), and neglect a more fundamental threat to our
system.
Instead, the majority of those supposed changes in criminal justice are
examples of longstanding practices and trends, well established prior to
2001. In those few exceptional cases where changes do appear to be taking
place, the U.S. process has been deliberative debate, a push-and-pull
between executive efforts to increase the reach of law enforcement and
both legislative and judicial efforts to restrain the executive branch. This
has resulted in precisely the political deliberation proponents of democracy
would hope for, including greater public awareness of government activity
and a gradual determination of the acceptable limits of the new normal.
This article begins by briefly discussing the literature of exceptionalism.2
It then turns to an empirical study of criminal justice practices, specifically
some that have received the most attention as overreactions to terrorism in
the wake of September 11th, 2001. It concludes with a discussion of the risks
we run by ignoring the completely precedented nature of our current
criminal justice overreaches.
A. Background: Assuming Exceptionalism
It seems that, whether one is in favor of an exceptional response to
terrorism or against it, there is general agreement that ‘‘everything chan-
ged,’’ generally beginning with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act3
and facilitated by widespread horror at the brutality of the attacks of
2001.4 Perhaps one of the best descriptions of the supposed exception
in which the United States placed itself is found in the work of David
Cole. Cole, a lawyer, has dedicated the past few years to documenting
changes in the legal landscape following the terrorist attacks of 2001.
2. Thanks to Mihaela Serban for this term.
3. Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PENN. J. OF CONST. L. 1001 (2004); Kevin Haggerty & Amber
Gazso, Seeing Beyond the Ruins: Surveillance as a Response to Terrorist Threats, 30 CAN. J.
SOC. 169 (2005); Susan Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARV. CRIM.-CIV. L. REV. 67 (2006); Ion Bogdan Vasi & David Strang,
Civil Liberty in America: The Diffusion of Municipal Bill of Rights Resolutions after the Passage
of the USA PATRIOT Act, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1716 (2009).
4. Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, & Christopher Weber, The Political Consequences of
Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity, 614 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 131 (2007).
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According to Cole, ‘‘The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, altered the
American landscape . . . the ‘national security state’ was born . . . The world
changed . . . The United States responded to the attacks by adopting what
then-attorney general John Ashcroft called a ‘paradigm of prevention.’’’5
Similarly, but from an opposing perspective, Benjamin Wittes argues that
‘‘the United States is building something new here, not applying something
old.’’6
Proponents of the supposedly new and exceptional measures argue that
the terrorist attacks exposed the need for modernization of contemporary
surveillance and other counterterror methods,7 the handling of classified
information and other procedural deficiencies in terrorism trials,8 and the
need to prevent rather than respond to terrorist attacks.9 Critics respond
that this push for prevention is merely an excuse for ‘‘the assertion of
executive and unilateral power.’’10 They criticize ‘‘new’’ criminal justice
techniques as the imposition of ‘‘guilt by association’’11 and overly intrusive
law enforcement tactics such as increasing surveillance.12
Yet many of the harshest critics of these policies, almost in the same
breath, acknowledge that the tactics were not entirely new. The USA
PATRIOT Act was made of provisions that already had great support,
in some cases the support of a prior (presumably) more liberal President,
5. SECURING LIBERTY: DEBATING ISSUES OF TERRORISM AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN
THE POST-9/11 UNITED STATES 1–2 (David Cole ed., 2011).
6. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 2 (2009).
7. David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, in LEGISLATING
THE WAR ON TERROR 217–51 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009).
8. E.g., Wells C. Bennett & Robert S. Litt, Better Rules for Terrorism Trials, 7
Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law 3 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.
edu/research/papers/2009/05/08-terrorism-litt-bennett.
9. Matthew Waxman, Police and national security: American local law enforcement and
counter-terrorism after 9/11, 3 J. OF NAT’L SEC. L. & POL. 377 (2009); Robert M. Chesney,
Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669
(2009); RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
10. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 1001; Herman, supra note 3.
11. David Cole, The new McCarthyism: Repeating history in the war on terrorism, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003); Robert Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention
Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408 (2003).
12. Claudia Aradau & Rens Van Munster, Exceptionalism and the ‘‘War on Terror’’:
Criminology Meets International Relations, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 686 (2009); Hagg-
erty & Gazso, supra note 3.
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which may well have contributed to its quick passage.13 David Cole’s
criticism of the use of ‘‘guilt by association’’ carries its own description
of the creation of those tactics, well before the 2001 attacks.14 The gradual
convergence of military courts, criminal courts, and law enforcement tac-
tics, noted by multiple scholars, also began prior to the 2001 attacks.15
Still, a few scholars have resisted this narrative. Their research suggests
that the overly preventive and unchecked nature of post-2001 criminal
justice practices has more to do with a trend of decreasing checks on
executive power and increasingly preventive tactics that well preceded the
2001 attacks than it has to do with the attacks themselves.16 This research
reminds us to look to the tactics used in conventional criminal justice to
create ‘‘end runs’’ or ‘‘short cuts’’ around traditional due process protections
before jumping to the conclusion that such short cuts are the invention of
overreactions to the threat of terrorism.17
This article offers to continue this critical examination. Content analysis
of over 300 terrorism cases, as well as legal analysis, shows that there is little
to be considered ‘‘new’’ in criminal justice in the wake of September 11th.
B. The Data
This research is based on a study of over 300 terrorism cases, consisting of
over 1,000 individual defendants. ‘‘Terrorism cases’’ were determined to be
those cases pursued in federal courts, where some government authority
13. Scheppele, supra note 3; Catherine Lutz, Making war at home in the United States:
Militarization and the current crisis, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 723 (2002); Dianne Piette,
Piercing the ‘‘Historical Mists’’: The People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the
Creation of the ‘‘Wall,’’ 17 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 437 (2006); Orrin Kerr, Internet Sur-
veillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
607 (2003).
14. DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2006); Cole, supra
note 11.
15. Cole & Dempsey, id.; Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Con-
vergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008).
16. Francesca Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures: An Example of Counterterror
Excesses and Their Roots in US Criminal Justice, 51 CRIM. L. BULL. 157 (2015); Francesca
Laguardia, Imagining the Unimaginable: Torture and Criminal Law, 46 COL. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 48 (2015); see also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1095 (2009).
17. Id. (any or all).
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has claimed that the defendant was engaging in terrorist activity or was
arrested in connection with a terrorism investigation. The research relies on
content analysis of the indictments and court files of a list of cases, which
was begun at the Center on Law and Security at New York University
School of Law, and which the author later updated with additional cases
and case resolutions.
The list proceeds from official claims that a defendant is associated with
terrorism, rather than making any attempt to define ‘‘terrorism.’’ It therefore
includes both domestic and internationally focused terrorists; terror groups
ranging from the Earth Liberation Front, to FARC (the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia), to al Qaeda. In a limited number of cases the
court files were enhanced with trial transcripts and personal attendance at
trials. These trial transcripts provide much greater detail on the evidence
against and investigation of the relevant defendants. For this reason, when-
ever possible, this article relies on these transcripts when describing cases. For
ease of understanding, the article refers to relevant defendants discussed in
the section of the article (i.e., ‘‘U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation,’’ rather than
‘‘U.S. v. El-Mezain’’). However, when referring to an appellate decision, the
formal title of the decision and formal citation are used.
I . ‘ ‘ EXCEPT IONAL ’ ’ COUNTER TERROR
PRACT ICES . . .AND THE IR NON -EXCEPT IONAL ISM
Scholars have claimed the terror attacks of 2001 have created, broadly, a pre-
ventive state, generally limiting civil rights and civil liberties,18 but this article
focuses only on those criminal justice policies that have gained the most
attention. Specifically, this article looks to the breadth and increasing use of
material support statutes, the use of preventive solitary confinement, surveil-
lance, and the increasing use and implications of classified evidence.
A. The Use of Material Support Statutes, Their Roots in Criminal
Conspiracy, and the de facto Lack of Difference Between the Two
Material support statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 2339, 2339A–D) might well be the
primary counterterror tool of law enforcement. The support criminalized
18. THE IMPACT OF 9/11 AND THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE: THE DAY THAT CHANGED
EVERYTHING? (Matthew Morgan ed., 2009).
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includes (according to prosecutors) everything from the provision of
personnel (such as oneself), to the provision of money, to the provision
of medical support or legal expertise.19 These statutes have been the most
commonly invoked federal criminal terrorism statutes.20
The material support statutes are favored by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) because of their broad reach, which enables the arrest and prosecu-
tion of individuals who have not yet, but might at some point, engage in
terrorist activities. To this end, material support statutes criminalize the
development of terrorist capabilities by criminalizing the acquisition of
training from terrorist organizations, or the provision of personnel to ter-
rorist organizations. In the words of a DOJ counterterrorism enforcement
manual, this enables law enforcement to arrest individuals for ‘‘the crime of
being a terrorist,’’ without any actual terrorist action having occurred.21
Although the strategic goal of sidelining terrorist activity is clearly
laudable, arresting and incarcerating individuals ‘‘for the crime of being
a terrorist’’ before they have even begun to think about actually attacking
19. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
20. FRANCESCA LAGUARDIA, CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY, TERRORISM TRIAL
REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2009 (Jan. 2010), available at http://
www.lawandsecurity.org/Publications/Terrorism-Trial-Report-Card; see also Andrew Peterson,
Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 297 (2008).
21. Peterson, id. at 301, quoting JEFFREY BREINHOLT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
LEGAL EDUCATION, COUNTERTERRORISM ENFORCEMENT: A LAWYER’S GUIDE 264 (2004).
A second goal of these statutes is to undermine the support systems of terror net-
works. Recruiting, training, equipping, and sending off individuals to launch violent attacks
require money, outreach, and the acquisition of numerous safe havens globally. Crimi-
nalizing the provision of such support enables law enforcement both to deter individuals
from participating in such activities and to incarcerate and thereby incapacitate individuals
who are not deterred. In theory, this effort will destroy the networks on which such or-
ganizations rely (see Peterson, supra note 20). Additionally, some government re-
presentatives seem to believe that individuals who support terrorist organizations through
funding, publication (expert advice or resources), transporting, or housing terrorists have
terrorist sympathies and may one day decide to become active terrorists themselves. As one
government attorney put it, ‘‘we would much rather catch terrorists with their hands on
a check than on a bomb’’ (Christopher Wray, Written Statement in Oversight Hearing:
Aiding Terrorists—An Examination of the Material Support Statute, Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (May 5, 2004), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print_testimony.cfm?id¼1172&wit_id¼3391). This does seem to be supported by the case of
Tarek Mehanna, who apparently turned to publishing terrorist literature when he failed to
find a terrorist training camp that would accept him for training (U.S. v. Mehanna,
Transcript of Proceedings (Dec. 16, 2011) (on file with author).
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targets has resulted in numerous critiques that these statutes criminalize
association. According to advocates and scholars, the breadth of behavior
criminalized in these material support statutes reaches to traditionally
protected First Amendment activities, and chills (and thereby infringes
on) activities that are not, and should not be, criminalized.22
But is the range of activities criminalized really broader post-2001 than it
already was prior to the September 11th attacks? In fact, the material sup-
port statutes were passed five years prior to the attacks, which is five years
prior to this supposed shift toward prevention. Even before to their passage,
some form of material support statute had been a topic of debate in
Congress for almost two decades.23 Moreover, as discussed below, despite
numerous amendments, it is unclear that material support statutes have
broadened in their preventive nature since their origin. In fact, the statutes
appear to broaden the reach of law enforcement very little, if at all, beyond
that provided by statutes criminalizing pre-material support, ‘‘ordinary’’
inchoate crimes.
Those material support statutes that were passed after the 2001 attacks,
18 U.S.C. § 2339C–D, are actually more specific, and therefore more lim-
ited than prior versions of material support, rather than less. Section 2339D
specifically criminalizes training at a terrorist training camp, and § 2339C
criminalizes the provision of funds for use in a terrorist act. Each contains
a requirement that defendants have specific knowledge of the terrorist
intentions of the group involved, something that was lacking from prior
material support statutes.
More importantly, each statute specifically criminalizes an activity that
was already well-covered by the earlier material support statutes, but with-
out this knowledge requirement. In fact, prior to the passage of § 2339D in
December of 2004, multiple defendants had already been indicted under
either § 2339A or § 2339B for training at a terrorist training camp or attempt-
ing to reach a terrorist training camp in order to train there, under the
logic that they had provided (or attempted to provide) personnel to terrorist
organizations. These included the Lackawanna 6, whose indictment relied
22. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and
Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455 (2012); David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong
Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorism, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 246–50.
23. Peterson, supra note 20; Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support
Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005).
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almost entirely on the fact that the group had attended high-level training
camps and had received training in firearms.24 Notably, only three of these
defendants received sentences that were lower than § 2339D’s maximum
sentence of ten years, and then not by much: two defendants were sentenced
to eight years in prison, and one was given a sentence of nine and a half years.
Those defendants who provided funds for use in a terrorist attack (as is
criminalized in § 2339C) not only could be charged under § 2339A or B, but
also as co-conspirators to the terrorist crime. Given the specific knowledge
requirement (that the funds must have been provided specifically for use in an
attack), intent to aid in the conspiracy would easily follow. These additions
therefore seem to have made little difference to the reach of the statutes.25
Rather than § 2339C or D, it was the original version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, criminalizing the provision of material support to a designated
terrorist organization, that created the greatest controversy,26 and rightfully
so. Press criticisms of the statute focused on the possibility that law enforce-
ment would arrest peaceful activists for entirely lawful expression of polit-
ical views.27 Interested parties at congressional hearings prior to the passage
of the law, such as the National Advisory Board of the American Muslim
Council, expressed their concern that lawful activity would be criminalized
in the absence of proof that the funds or assistance provided would be used
to support terrorism actively, as opposed to charity or more peaceful polit-
ical efforts.28 Concerns about the content-based nature of the statute were
24. Affidavit by FBI special agent Edward Needham, USA v. Yahya Goba et al.,
Criminal Complaint, September 13, 2002 (on file with author).
25. Congress did also amend the material support statutes to allow for longer sentences,
by five years, and to provide a life sentence if death results from any of the listed criminal
acts. An exception for ‘‘humanitarian aid’’ was replaced with a more specific exception for
provision of ‘‘medicine or religious materials.’’ None of these amendments, however, affect
the reach, and therefore the First Amendment implications, of the statutes.
26. In 2001, the ‘‘expert advice or assistance’’ prong was added to the list of types of
material support in § 2339A. This prong quickly became a lightning rod for criticism of the
statute, although the groups criticizing the statute, and the reasons for their criticism, had
long preceded this language (see, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th
Cir. 2000)). Because precisely this criticism had already existed prior to the 2001 amend-
ment, it is unlikely that the amendment itself broadened the reach of the statute.
27. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: This is America, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1995, at A17;
David Kopel, Terrifying Terror Legislation?, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at A14.
28. Azizah al-Hibri, Statement of Azizah al-Hibri, National Advisory Board, American
Muslim Council, 104th Congress, 455 (1995); see also note 21, supra.
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evident in discussions of precursors of the statute as well as the statute itself,
with critics often focusing on the ability of the executive to criminalize
support of any organization, and reiterating their fears of a McCarthy-
esque executive branch. A series of editorials in the Washington Post spec-
ified the threat that the executive would criminalize supplying food to
Nicaraguan rebels, while others focused on the Irish Republican Army and
the Palestine Liberation Organization.29
Yet these threats rarely materialized. It is true that indictments under §
2339B made up nearly half of all indictments under terrorism statutes, and
nearly one-third of all indictments under terrorism or national security
statutes between 2001 and 2010. Perhaps more importantly, use of the
statute without support of other terrorism or national security violations
(such as conspiracies to murder soldiers overseas, or to use explosive ma-
terials) makes up over 40 percent of instances where the statute is used.
Most often, these prosecutions appear to be based on allegations that
defendants endeavored to provide weapons or technology to foreign fight-
ers, or by allegations that defendants were soliciting or providing funds for
terrorist organizations. These final types of support were always far less
controversial as statutory violations, because they require the provision of
tangible support rather than mere advocacy. Therefore, they should avoid
the types of infringements on speech and association that are brought about
in the cases of prohibitions on advice or recruitment.
Perhaps more to the point, the cases that do seem to infringe on First
Amendment concerns also appear exceedingly similar to cases not prose-
cuted under § 2339B, suggesting that the addition of § 2339B is less of
a change than critics believed. For instance, Sami Omar al-Hussayen was
charged with (and acquitted of) providing material support to terrorists
under § 2339B by offering support to terrorist organizations in the form of
linking his organization’s website to sites where readers could donate to
Hamas or download terror recruitment videos.30 But compare this to Tarek
29. Editorial, Anti-Terrorism (Cont’d.), WASHINGTON POST, May 9, 1984, at A30;
Editorial, Bad Legislation, WASHINGTON POST, May 1, 1984, at A14; Editorial, One Man’s
Freedom Fighter . . . , WASHINGTON POST, July 20, 1984, at A20; Editorial, Resisting Terror—
And Lawlessness, WASHINGTON POST, April 29, 1984, at E20; Larry Magasak, Denton to Push
for Law Against Americans Helping Terrorists, Associated Press, May 19, 1985; Editorial,
BOSTON HERALD, August 15, 1992, at 14.
30. U.S. v. al-Hussayen, Second Superseding Indictment, Filed 3/4/04 (on file with
author).
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Mehanna, who was convicted of the more specific § 2339A for watching
jihadi videos, discussing the religious justification for jihad, and translating
terrorist documents into English and making them available online.
Although Mehanna had attempted to join terror training camps, he had
failed to do so, and the speech activity that made up the core of several
charges against him was speech he appears to have made largely indepen-
dently, rather than at the direction of a terrorist organization.
At trial, the government argued that an overseas online group, for which
Mehanna had been offering translation services, was acting on behalf of al
Qaeda, and that Mehanna purposefully offered translation services to this
extremist online organization in order to aid al Qaeda. But the connection
between Mehanna and al Qaeda was tenuous at best, with witnesses—
including prosecution witnesses and even the Assistant U.S. Attorney pros-
ecuting the case—seeming to agree that the online group had arisen inde-
pendently, as ‘‘a forum dedicated to jihad . . . where supporters of jihad
worked together in order to promote these subjects by producing transla-
tions of al Qa’ida propaganda, guide books, and other materials,’’ that
eventually came to the attention of al Qaeda.31 Although al Qaeda, there-
after, allegedly ‘‘worked in coordination’’ with the online group, there was
a distinct lack of evidence that Mehanna knew of this direct coordina-
tion.32 For these reasons, his activities appear as independent advocacy and
encouragement of an ideology with which he agreed, rather than specific
aid to a terrorist organization.
Perhaps even more threatening to the First Amendment was the pre-
2001 language of the prosecution of (and appellate decisions regarding) the
Blind Sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman. Abdel Rahman33 was convicted of
seditious conspiracy (to ‘‘wage a war of urban terrorism’’ against the United
States), solicitation of murder, conspiracy to commit murder (both in
regard to a plot to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak), and
a bombing conspiracy (involving plots to bomb the United Nations, fed-
eral buildings, and New York City tunnels), based on his alleged encour-
agement of terrorist activities. In upholding Abdel Rahman’s conviction,
31. U.S. v. Mehanna, Transcript of Proceedings 12/16/2011 (prosecution closing state-
ment) at 68–9 (on file with author).
32. Id.
33. The case is officially cited as United States v. Rahman, however, the Blind Sheikh’s
attorneys insisted on the use of the full ‘‘Abdel Rahman,’’ as ‘‘Rahman’’ is not a name
accepted in Islamic culture.
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the Second Circuit stated that recommending that the defendants attack
the U.S. Army rather than the United Nations (a suggestion that was not
followed), and such exhortations as (in response to a request for religious
approval of a plot), ‘‘Carry out this operation. It does not require a fatwa,’’
amounted to conspiracy to use force, rather than advocating the use of force
(which would have been protected speech under the First Amendment).34
In fact, the allegations against Abdel Rahman consisted of his leading the
conspiracy, rather than merely being involved; the Second Circuit’s ruling
implicitly upheld the notion that Abdel Rahman’s unfollowed suggestion
could support such charges. This threat to the First Amendment, then,
hardly seems to have originated in the material support statutes.
Similarly, Emerson Begolly was charged with solicitation to commit
a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 373(a)), based on his emphatic encourage-
ment of terrorist activities on a radical Islamist Internet forum, and his
posting of publicly available instructions on how to build a bomb.35 Since
Begolly pleaded guilty, there is no trial transcript and very few documents
by which to research the case, and many of the documents filed in the case
are sealed. Yet the (redacted) sentencing memorandum filed by the gov-
ernment suggests that Begolly’s solicitation consisted of exhorting visitors
of the website to engage in terrorist activities, and offering ideas for possible
targets. It does not suggest that he offered any inducement for those acts,
such as financial or other benefits, other than his own opinion that they
were justified and laudable.36
Cases such as Begolly’s suggest that the material support statutes them-
selves are hardly broadening the scope of possible prosecutions more than
enterprising prosecutors, and accepting judges and juries, are doing with
traditional, ‘‘conventional’’ inchoate crimes (such as solicitation to a crime
of violence).
A stronger argument might be that First Amendment protections have
universally decreased since 2001, ignoring the creation of new statutes, and
this is why these similar prosecutions are allowed to continue under conven-
tional statutes. Yet here too, prior to 2001, the courts had little trouble
disposing of the issue. As the Second Circuit stated of the Abdel Rahman
conviction, crimes, in particular crimes of conspiracy, were often committed
34. U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104, 115 (2d Cir. 1999).
35. U.S. v. Begolly, Sentencing Memorandum by U.S.A., 7/9/2013 (on file with author).
36. Id.
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‘‘through’’ speech, and that this did not insulate them from sanction. The
interest at stake was one of pure prevention, and speech concerns could have
little bearing in such a circumstance. The court stated:
One of the beneficial purposes of the conspiracy law is to permit arrest and
prosecution before the substantive crime has been accomplished. The
Government, possessed of evidence of conspiratorial planning, need not
wait until buildings and tunnels have been bombed and people killed before
arresting the conspirators.37
Indeed, in its list of speech that might be criminal, the Second Circuit
included not only words that instruct or solicit, but also speech that
persuades.38
Together, these cases suggest that the addition of material support
statutes made little difference to the ability, willingness, or frequency of
prosecutors engaging in the types of prosecutions most feared by advo-
cates against the statutes. Although, certainly, they have been seized upon
by law enforcement agents eager to find a way to incarcerate persons who
are believed to pose a threat, their novelty is belied both by their long
history and by the opportunistic use of established statutes prior to their
creation. Instead of ‘‘new’’ tactics, or even ‘‘new’’ applications, prosecutors
and law enforcement agents moved slowly, beginning prior to 2001, to
arrest earlier and earlier, utilizing what statutory support they could find.
Rather than a sudden shift, legitimized by the 2001 attacks, the attacks
occurred in the middle of a gradual progression, which continued in the
wake of 2001.
B. Preventive Detention
Preventive detention of terror suspects has become a central point of
criticism for those arguing that the criminal justice system has changed in
fundamental and inappropriate ways in response to the threat of terrorism.39
Since 2001, it has become common practice to detain terror suspects in
37. Rahman, supra note 34, at 115.
38. Id. at 117, emphasis added.
39. E.g., Statement of Faiza Patel, Symposium, Trial & Terrorism: The Implications of
Trying National Security Cases in Article III Courts 2015 NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y, taped
proceedings available at http://jnslp.com/symposium/; Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in
Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism
Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 81 (2003–2004).
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solitary confinement both before and after trial. Held in super-maximum
security facilities, and/or under conditions of confinement limiting their
ability to communicate with other inmates, their families, and their
lawyers, terror suspects experience a level of isolation commonly assumed
to be unheard of in other U.S. federal criminal cases or prior to 2001.
These conditions of confinement are referred to as Special Administrative
Measures, covered by 28 C.F.R. 501.3 and 501.3(a) (hereinafter referred to
as SAMs).
Terror suspects appear to be relegated to these conditions ‘‘reflexively,’’
that is, with little to no substantive analysis of whether such a high level of
confinement is necessary.40 Whereas super-maximum security conditions
of confinement are meant to be applied only in circumstances that require
their use to protect other inmates, prison staff, or the populace in general,41
in the cases of terror suspects, they appear to be applied routinely and
without regard to those conditions.42
This reflexive application is demonstrated, for instance, in the repeated
imposition of SAMs upon defendants whom judges do not believe to be
dangerous or to have current connections to broader terror networks. One
example is the case of Mohamed Warsame, detained under SAMs for over
four years prior to trial, by a judge who stated both before and after trial
that the defendant did not appear to be dangerous.43 Another is the case of
Syed Hashmi, held under SAMs even though the charges against him
involved no violence and no allegations that he could engage in terrorism
himself or direct others to do so, and the government informant who had
identified him had stated that he was kept out of terrorist activities or
knowledge because he was too much of a public figure.44 As one prosecutor
stated in court, the use of solitary confinement prior to trial is simply ‘‘the
40. Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures, supra note 16.
41. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long Term Solitary and ‘‘Supermax’’ Confine-
ment, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 124 (2003); 28 C.F.R. §§ 501–501.3(a) (2016).
42. Patel, supra note 39; Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures, supra note 16;
Kareem Fahim, Restrictive Terms of Prisoner’s Confinement Add Fuel to Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2009, at A27.
43. Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures, supra note 16; U.S. v. Warsame, tran-
script of sentencing, July 9, 2009 (on file with author); U.S. v. Warsame Memorandum,
Opinion on Sentencing, Aug. 24, 2009.
44. U.S. v. Hashmi, Indictment, on file with author; U.S. v. Hashmi, transcript of
proceedings, June 1, 2007, 5–6 (on file with author).
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way [terrorism] defendants are held,’’ regardless of the substance of the
charges against them or the circumstances of their cases.45
This stands in stark contrast to the language of the regulation allowing
for SAMs, which states that they are to be imposed in those cases where
a defendant poses a risk of disclosing classified information or causing
serious physical injury from his jail cell. Worse, critics argue, it stands in
stark contrast to pre-2001 or non-terror related Department of Justice,
Bureau of Prisons, and judicial practices.46
Yet the use of SAMs is well rooted in pre-2001 conventional criminal
practices. Regulations allowing for pretrial solitary confinement of defen-
dants believed to pose an imminent danger were passed in 1988,47 almost
immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision that pretrial deten-
tion based on the dangerousness of a defendant was constitutionally allow-
able.48 The use of pretrial solitary confinement was certainly in use by the
early 1990s.49
Whereas early cases were differentiated based on the amount of evidence
prosecutors had that the defendant might pose a serious risk of harm from his
jail cell,50 by 2001, the practice had already deviated from being based on
a likelihood of causing harm from one’s cell, to the ability to cause harm from
one’s cell, placing it well on its way to the reflexive use criticized above.51 As
an example, Wadih el Hage was detained on the basis of, according to the
Second Circuit, ‘‘reams of exhibits’’ demonstrating his involvement with the
1998 U.S. embassy bombings committed by al Qaeda, in spite of the fact that
the district court had already determined that el Hage would not be able to
engage in terrorist activities if released from prison, let alone if released from
45. U.S. v. Sadequee, transcript of proceedings, Mar. 3, 2009, at 43 (on file with author).
46. E.g., Patel, supra note 39; David M. Shapiro, How Terror Transformed Federal Prison:
Communication Management Units, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47 (2012);
47. Inmate Discipline, 53 Fed. Reg. 197 (Jan. 5, 1988).
48. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
49. Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures, supra note 16, citing U.S. v. Gotti, 755 F.
Supp. 1159, 1164–65 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), and U.S. v. Nosair, No. 93 Cr. 181, 1994 WL 469364, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1994).
50. Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures, supra note 16, citing Gotti, id., Nosair, id.,
U.S. v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998), and U.S. v. Suleiman, No. 96CR933WK, 1997
WL220308, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1997).
51. Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures, supra note 16, citing U.S. v. El-Hage, 213
F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2000).
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solitary confinement.52 The Second Circuit determined, in this case, that
evidence of el Hage’s continuing dangerousness while imprisoned in the
general population was unnecessary to justify his SAMs. Instead, his SAMs
were to be justified on the fact that he had obtained access to sensitive
government information over the course of his confinement, which he could
conceivably release to interested parties.53
This ruling deviated from prior SAMs practice in three ways. First, it
allowed for the confinement of a defendant under SAMs based on a threat
that he would release sensitive information, rather than the classified infor-
mation that the SAMs regulation mentions as a legitimate purpose of
SAMs. Second, and more importantly, SAMs were justified on the basis
of the defendant’s capability to cause that harm, rather than evidence that
he was likely to engage in harmful behavior from prison. In doing so, the
Second Circuit made clear that SAMs would now be justified on the
possibility, rather than the likelihood, of harm. Finally, the opinion offered
this justification with no discussion even of the government’s evidence that
this disclosure of sensitive information was possible. Instead, the opinion
gives the clear impression that a mere assertion by the government of a risk
of harm from the defendant would be sufficient to justify SAMs. Together,
these three deviations show an abdication of the role of oversight that the
judiciary had played in the application of SAMs up to 2000.
This abdication was completed in the case of Yousef v. Reno in 2001
(mere months prior to the September 11th attacks). Again, in the case of
Ramzi Yousef, the court was confronted with a defendant whose condi-
tions of confinement, one may assume, easily could be justified. Not only
had Yousef been convicted of two violent terrorist plots,54 a government
informant had provided the government with handwritten letters con-
taining threats that Yousef was engaging in violent criminal activity while
incarcerated.55
Yet rather than confronting the facts of the case, the Tenth Circuit
discovered a way by which to abandon its role of oversight. Specifically,
the Tenth Circuit focused on the question of whether Yousef had
exhausted his administrative remedies. He had not, the court determined,
52. El Hage, id.
53. Id.
54. Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001).
55. U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
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in spite of the fact that the Bureau of Prisons had responded to Yousef’s
informal application for relief by stating that it had no jurisdiction to
review his SAMs.56 Yousef v. Reno was followed by a landslide of cases
wherein judges dismissed prisoners’ challenges of their SAMs, citing the
requirement that prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies, and often
citing Yousef v. Reno specifically.57
This method of abdication was in no way unique to terror cases or to
SAMs cases. To the contrary, the detrimental effect of the requirement that
prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies, specifically the complete
dismantling of judicial oversight of the conditions of confinement, has
been bemoaned by numerous scholars of punishment and prisons.58
Indeed, this trend of increasingly preventive detention, and decreasing
judicial oversight of governmental allegations regarding the need for such
detention, effectively explains the el Hage case as well, and the entire trend
of increasing use of SAMs. Far from an exception, the oversight of prisons
uniformly disappeared from judicial practice over this same period. The
reflexive application of SAMs and the government’s unilateral decision
making in this area is therefore hardly shocking.
I I . F I SA—THE PRECURSOR OF METADATA COLLECT ION ,
AND THE F IGHT OVER CONTENT
The revelations that have come to light about the reach of NSA surveillance
are many and varied, but they may be summarized in three small words: it
56. Yousef, supra note 54.
57. See Yousef, supra note 55, at 166; Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F.Supp.2d, 13 n.5 (D.D.C.
2003); United States v. Elzahabi, No. 04-282 (D. Minn) ORDER of Dec. 7, 2005, at note 5,
available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case¼11004938886914500817&
q¼elþzahabiþdecemberþ2005&hl¼en&as_sdt¼2,33; U.S. v. Ali, 2005 WL 2757939 (E.
D. Va. Oct. 24, 2005); U.S. v. Sattar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79328 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); U.S.
v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008); Ayyad v. Gonzales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62863
(D. Colo. 2008).
58. Keramet Ann Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary
Confinement in U.S. Prisons 1960–2006, 57 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 71 (2012); Van
Swearingen, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated Governance in the Prison Inmate
Grievance Process, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1353 (2008); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating
Prisons of the Future: A Pscyhological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.
U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477 (1997).
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is vast. Specifically, the NSA appears to be conducting completely untar-
geted surveillance of the telephonic communications of, possibly, the entire
population of the United States. Verizon has been ordered to turn over all
records of phone calls received and dialed as well as the length of the call,59
and apparently Sprint and AT&T give the same records to the govern-
ment.60 In a somewhat more targeted strategy, the NSA also collects
contact lists from Internet messaging providers such as Yahoo, Hotmail,
and Gmail,61 as well as the content of Internet communications.62 For
these Internet communications, some connection to a foreign intelligence
target is, allegedly, required for the NSA to collect the records, although
this connection may be somewhat removed, so that the NSA may collect
records on people who are connected to legitimate targets.63 This infor-
mation may be supplemented with credit card transaction records, pro-
vided by credit card companies.64 It is unclear whether the information
from credit card companies is acquired in a targeted or bulk fashion. The
NSA has also collected the contents of phone conversations (i.e., the NSA
has performed wiretapping) of U.S. citizens.65
59. In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., on Behalf of
MCI Communication Services, Inc., D/B/A/ Verizon Business Services, United States
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, April 25 2013, available at https://epic.org/privacy/
nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf.
60. Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, & Janet Hook. US Collects Vast Data Trove. WALL
STREET J, June 7, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873
24299104578529112289298922.
61. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books
Globally, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/
8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.
62. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine




63. Gellman & Poitras, id.; Gellman & Soltani, supra note 61.
64. Gorman et al., supra note 60.
65. Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Often Broke Rules on Privacy, Audit Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2013, at A0, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/us/nsa-often-broke-rules-
on-privacy-audit-shows.html.
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This next section first discusses the collection of metadata, and its pre-
cursors in U.S. constitutional law and criminal justice practice. The pos-
sibility that amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA) have substantially increased the collection of the content of
telephone and Internet communications will be discussed in the following
section.
A. Metadata Outside the Context of Terrorism: The Conventional
Criminal Precursors of the NSA Data Collection Program
Although the extent of NSA metadata surveillance may be surprising to the
public, it is unsurprising in light of current technological capabilities and
traditional law enforcement practices. In fact, conventional law enforce-
ment agencies have for decades collected metadata in the form of call
records, bank records, and business transactions with the mere application
of a subpoena.
The law regarding the collection of metadata begins and ends with the
third-party exception to the Fourth Amendment. Via this exception, infor-
mation given to a third party loses its Fourth Amendment protection,
under the theory that information provided to a third party cannot be
reasonably expected to remain private.66 Although the exception may have
begun with the concept of admissions to informants,67 it quickly pro-
gressed to include bank records,68 the phone records required for phone
companies to bill customers,69 and items left to be picked up by others
(such as garbage)—no matter the level of expectation one might have as to
how far afield that information might travel.70
The Third Party Doctrine was highly criticized long prior to 2001,71
but the public’s increasing attention to preventive policing and increasing
66. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
67. Kerr, supra note 66; Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment Papers
and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247 (2015); Hoffa v. U.S., 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
68. U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
69. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
70. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
71. Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of ‘‘Search’’ in the Fourth
Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 580 (1988) (Cases relying on
the Third Party Doctrine are some of the most highly criticized Fourth Amendment cases.);
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technological reliance have brought its flaws into stark relief.72 Modern
technology creates records of almost every purchase (through credit cards),
from medical supplies, to contraceptives, to political donations.73 Research,
curiosity, and social activity are commonly completed on the Web, and
Internet service providers keep records of all of this activity, as do advertising
agencies.74 Cell phone companies regularly collect and maintain records of
the locations of their associated phones, leading to the question of whether
anyone using a cell phone could be tracked at any time.75 At the extreme
interpretation of the doctrine, an argument could be made that all written
communications completed via the Internet or via texting are stored in third-
party files, and therefore have no Fourth Amendment protection against
government search.76
But even if post-2001 counterterror policies (including the massive
record collections enabled by FISA amendments) have highlighted these
flaws, this does not mean the flaws appeared only in light of the threat of
terrorism or the nation’s response to that threat. To the contrary, as noted
above, the Third Party Doctrine has been roundly criticized since its
inception. Current scholars debating the extent of the damage caused by
the doctrine do not argue that some new, post-terror interpretation has
created its problems, but that current technology has demonstrated the
inherent deficiency of Fourth Amendment protection and the need to
make a fresh start.77
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
2.7(c), at 747 (4th ed. 2004) (‘‘The result reached in Miller is dead wrong, and the Court’s
woefully inadequate reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth Amendment
protection which the Court had developed in Katz.’’).
72. Price, supra note 67; Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the
Third-Party Records Doctrine Be Revisited?, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:20 A.M.), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_data_question_should_the_third-party_
records_doctrine_be_revisited/; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2002).
73. Solove, supra note 72, at 1092–93.
74. Id.
75. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 963 (2012); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the
Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70MD. L. REV. 614,
638–39 (2011).
76. Strandburg, id.; Price, supra note 67, at 21.
77. Suggested reformulations of Fourth Amendment doctrine have included a recom-
mendation to follow First Amendment principles (Price, supra note 67) or to look at privacy
invasions from a totality of the circumstances, a mosaic approach, rather than an individual
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Nor is this extreme interpretation merely theoretical, nor has it been
used solely in response to terrorism or post-2001. It is now clear that law
enforcement both assumed this interpretation of the Third Party Doctrine
to be accurate, and acted on that assumption, in response to conventional
criminal activity predating 2001. In 2013, the public learned of the Hemi-
sphere Project, a database shared amongst federal, state, and local law
enforcement (in response to subpoenas rather than warrants) that held
records of every long-distance or international call ‘‘for every telephone
carrier that uses an AT&T switch to process a telephone call.’’78 The
project had already been ongoing for 27 years by that point79—at least
fourteen years prior to the supposed crisis of 2001—and was used primarily
as an investigative tool against conventional (non-terror) crimes.
In 2015, a separate program was revealed,80 involving a call records
database maintained by the Drug Enforcement Agency and containing
every record of every American phone call made overseas to certain coun-
tries.81 At its height, this program collected the records of every American
phone call made to 116 countries.82 This program was also in place well
before 2001, by almost a decade, and was primarily focused on drug crimes
rather than any fears of domestic or international terrorism.83
These programs demonstrate law enforcement’s own take on its author-
ity under the Third Party Doctrine, as well as its knowledge of the oppor-
tunities for manipulation that doctrine offered in conjunction with modern
technology. Although the NSA’s program reached further than either of
these two, its existence seems a natural development in the context of the
step-by-step analysis (Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 311 (2012)).
78. Synopsis of the Hemisphere Project, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2013/09/02/us/hemisphere-project.html.
79. Id.; Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing
N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, at A1.
80. Presumably the programs are separate, as one dates back to 1987 and the other,
reportedly, to 1992.
81. Hanni Fakhouri, The Many Problems with the DEA’s Bulk Phone Records Collection
Program, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Jan. 23, 2015, https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2015/01/many-problems-deas-bulk-phone-records-collection-program.
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developments already taking place in federal and state law enforcement,
as demonstrated by these programs. The NSA’s broad and aggressive inter-
pretation of the Third Party Doctrine had already been established and put
to use in law enforcement more broadly, and in the context of conventional
criminal investigation. To the extent that NSA collection of metadata
(rather than content) is being considered, it is difficult to make an argu-
ment that this would not have happened without the context of, or panic
caused by, the attacks of 2001.
In contrast, the collection of content appears to present precisely this
threat. The following section addresses this question.
B. Collection of Content
Laura Donohue has offered a comprehensive explanation of the expansion
of content surveillance of U.S. telephone and Internet communications,
through the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.84 Donohue asserts that
amendments to §§ 702–704 have allowed U.S. intelligence to collect and
maintain content of the communications of U.S. persons (including both
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens) that relates to purely domestic
activities, so long as the intelligence community carefully neglects to notice
or research whether or not the persons surveilled are in fact U.S. persons,
or whether or not the collected communications involve domestic
matters.85
Donahue’s analysis is compelling and concerning, and certainly tends to
show a substantive legal change following 2001 that might well affect
criminal justice more broadly. However, the history she describes is also
worth noting, and suggests that rather than a panicked response to 2001,
the codification of these intelligence capabilities has been (and continues to
be) slow and deliberative.
As Donohue describes, the FISA amendments were first envisaged in the
form of the Presidential Surveillance Program (PSP), a truly exceptional
program, conceived immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks and
legally questionable.86 As would be expected from a program created out of
84. Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the collection of international telephone and
internet content, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015).
85. Id. at, e.g., 123–24, 193–94.
86. Id. at 125–26.
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panic and exceptionalism, the legal basis for the PSP was entirely founded
in war powers.87
But the universally positive (or at least acquiescent) response to this
program that we might have expected in a state of emergency never mate-
rialized. To the contrary, as soon as the public became alerted to the pro-
gram, the G.W. Bush Administration began scrambling to justify it.88
Indeed, Congress’s response to the revelations of the program appears to
have been to clarify (i.e., specify and thereby limit) the surveillance authority
that the PATRIOT ACT had granted the executive branch.89
The executive branch responded by venturing into strategic interpretations
of the statute in order to broaden its authority.90 This strategy also met with
resistance, not only from Congress but from the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (FISC). According to Donohue, rather than simply abiding by
executive branch arguments, it took FISC eighteen months to accept Presi-
dent Bush’s logic, and even then FISC rejected the logic when applied to
domestic facilities.91 Moreover, even the acceptance of the President’s efforts
to broaden PATRIOT’s reach failed to offer the flexibility the PSP had
granted. The new interpretation placed the President’s efforts in the legal
context of FISA, but FISA was more restrictive than the PSP had been (requir-
ing oversight, including probable cause determinations, by FISC). It was for
this reason that the executive branch began pursuing FISA amendments.92
While the Bush Administration was successful in pushing Congress to
amend FISA, via the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), the amendments also
included numerous limitations on executive action and privacy protections
for individuals. As to § 702, covering the targeting of non-U.S. persons
abroad, these protections include minimization procedures, as well as the
creation of procedures to ‘‘ensure that the acquisition is limited to targeting
individuals outside of the United States and to prevent the intentional
acquisition of domestic communications,’’93 as well as reporting require-
ments designed to ensure that these procedures are being met.94
87. Id.
88. Id. at 127, n. 131.
89. Id. at 131.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 133.
92. Id. at 135.
93. Id. at 139–40.
94. Id. at 140–41.
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Section 703 requires comparable procedures to FISA, including probable
cause requirements, when the government is acquiring electronic surveil-
lance of a U.S. person who is outside the United States, but the acquisition
will be inside the United States.95 It also limits the retention, as well as the
dissemination, of intelligence acquired.96 Section 704 forbids the inten-
tional targeting of U.S. persons outside the United States who have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, unless the targeting can be authorized under
FISA.97 However, it does not place minimization requirements on data
retention, and appears in practice to apply only when intelligence agents
know that the person they are targeting is a U.S. person.98 Neither section
includes the particularity requirements one would traditionally assume
would accompany eavesdropping (as to whether the device surveilled will
be used by the target for the purposes justifying the surveillance).99
These changes are substantial. However, they have not gone unchal-
lenged. Indeed, criticisms immediately followed the passage of the FAA
from the academic community, from civil liberties advocates, and from
Congress itself.100 This Congressional response may come in part from the
fact that members of Congress appear not to have fully comprehended the
implications of the Amendments when passing the legislation.101
Although the Amendments were renewed in 2012,102 the NSA’s surveillance
practices have remained a news staple, and revocation of the powers is
a repeated topic in presidential debates,103 with a slim majority of Americans
disapproving of the practices.104 Scholarly articles such as Donohue’s105
95. Id. at 143.
96. Id. at 144.
97. 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2) (2015).
98. Donohue, supra note 84, at 143.
99. Id. at 144.
100. Id. at 153–4, 177–79.
101. Id. at 174–75.
102. Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1777, 1779 (2013).
103. Transcript, Republican Candidates Debate, Dec. 15, 2015, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼111177; Transcript, Democratic Candidates Debate, Oct. 13,
2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼110903.
104. George Gao, Pew Research Center, What Americans Think About Surveillance,
National Security, and Privacy (May 29, 2015), at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2015/05/29/what-americans-think-about-nsa-surveillance-national-security-and-privacy/.
105. Donohue, supra note 84.
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and more general scholarly indictments of current Fourth Amendment
doctrine106 echo and amplify these concerns. It appears that although the
FISA amendments are holding on, they are holding on tenuously, and may
be modified or revoked before they have an opportunity to substantially
change criminal justice (certainly before they modify criminal justice prac-
tices beyond those allowances that already existed, as noted above in Sec-
tion II.A).
I I I . THE USE OF CLASS IF IED INFORMAT ION
Limitations on defense attorneys’ opportunities to evaluate classified evi-
dence against their clients can severely impact their chances to test govern-
ment claims, and terrorism trials (and cases based on evidence built in
terrorism investigations) implicate classified information in a number of
ways that conventional criminal trials do not. Terrorism trials may involve
investigations by foreign intelligence agencies, and therefore include infor-
mation that the U.S. government classifies in order to protect its working
relationship with the other country. They may involve investigation by our
own intelligence community, and therefore certain sources and methods of
obtaining information may be classified. They may involve interrogations
of detainees at Guantánamo or other detention sites, the details of which
have been classified.
Although these circumstances arise far more frequently in terrorism
cases, they are being resolved in a manner that was already well established
prior to the 2001 attacks. The Classified Information Procedures Act107
(CIPA) was passed in 1980, to allow prosecutors to continue with cases
where classified information might be implicated at trial. The Congressio-
nal record suggests that numerous cases had arisen over the 1970s in which
prosecutors had been forced to dismiss criminal cases due to defendants’
threats that they would reveal classified information in the course of their
trials if the government persisted in prosecuting them.108 This problem
was referred to as ‘‘graymail.’’
106. See notes 66–71, supra, and accompanying text.
107. P.L. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, enacted October 15, 1980, 18 U.S.C. Appx. III §§ 1–16.
108. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and
FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2005); Larry Eig, Classified Information
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Because of this, the statute focuses on the creation of pretrial procedures
and the requirement that defense attorneys disclose prior to trial any clas-
sified information they expect to reveal over the course of the trial. This
allows the government to make an informed decision about how to deal
with the issue, before being confronted with the material (or an adverse
ruling allowing the introduction of the material) at trial. At these pretrial
hearings, the judge is to determine whether the information is truly nec-
essary for a defendant’s case. If not, the prosecutor is under no obligation to
disclose the information, and the judge will forbid the defendant from
doing so.109
However, in preparation for those instances when defendants’ rights do
require exploring otherwise classified information, CIPA creates a proce-
dure by which prosecutors may substitute either a government admission
of the relevant facts or a summary of the information, rather than providing
the information itself.110 If the judge determines that substitution would
be insufficient to protect the defendant’s rights, he or she may preclude
witnesses, dismiss charges, or dismiss the entire indictment, depending on
the extent to which the classified information permeates the allegations
against the defendant.111
CIPA does not provide for a judge to order that information be declas-
sified. Nor does CIPA allow judges to require that defense attorneys be
allowed to investigate the relevant classified information to determine
whether or not the substitution provided sufficiently describes the relevant
information. Instead, judges are provided the classified information that
prosecutors believe to be relevant, and judges determine whether the sum-
maries adequately describe the information.112
This is by no means a perfect solution, particularly for defendants.
Substitutions cannot be cross-examined, and the classified nature of the
Procedures Act (CIPA): An Overview (Congressional Research Service, 1989); H.R. Rep, No.
96–831, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980).
109. Yaroshefsky, id.; CIPA at §§ 5, 6(e).
110. CIPA at § 6(c).
111. CIPA at § 6(e)(2).
112. Yaroshefsky, supra note 108, at 1069 and n.29; see also U.S. v. Moussaoui, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 480, 481 (2003) (‘‘the United States has advised the Court that it cannot, consistent
with national security considerations, comply with the Court’s Orders of January 31 and
August 29, 2003. The Court must accept this representation as the product of the reasoned
judgment of the Executive Branch.’’ (footnotes omitted)).
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background material makes independent investigation into the circum-
stances of its creation almost impossible.113 But these issues were familiar
long before 2001.114 Multiple cases arising prior to 2001 emphasize the
importance of vigorous adversarial examination by opposing attorneys and
parties, and the problems CIPA created by limiting this examination.
Secret evidence in pre-2001 deportation cases has been discovered to
hide rumor, stereotyping, and mistranslations.115 Highlighting this point
even further, mistranslations in particular are a recurring theme only found
after adversarial examination in terrorism prosecutions.116 For instance, in
the cases of both Aref and Warsame, an Arabic word was believed to mean
‘‘commander,’’ but turned out after defense translation to mean instead
‘‘brother,’’ ‘‘comrade,’’ or ‘‘trainer.’’117
Still, the passage of CIPA in late 1980 illustrates the fact that the idea that
defendants must simply cope with such invasions on their ability to cross-
examine witnesses adequately is not a new function of counterterrorism post-
2001. In truth, a defendant’s rights to disclosure are fairly limited in general.
A defendant may be entitled to exculpatory evidence, but he is never entitled
to view every single document or piece of information held by prosecutors in
order to determine for himself what is exculpatory in his case. He is entitled
to the prior recorded statements of any witnesses, under Giglio,118 but this is
113. For criticisms of CIPA, see Yaroshefsky, supra note 108; Joshua Dratel, Section 4 of the
Classified Information Procedures Act: The Growing Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE
L. REV. 1041 (2007).
114. David Greenberger, An Overview of the Ethical Implications of the Classified Infor-
mation Procedures Act, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151 (1998); Frank Askin, Secret Justice and
the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745 (1990).
115. Susan Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological
Exclusion, 14 GEORGETOWN IMMIGR. L.J. 87 (1999).
116. Such instances include U.S. v. Rahman 1:93-cr-00181 SDNY (e.g., Trial Tr. 4/18/1995
at 8229 (Cross Examination of Abdel Hafiz, translation disagreement as to whether ‘‘what is
your command’’ is just a way of saying ‘‘goodbye’’) (on file with author); U.S. v. Holy Land
Foundation 3:04-cr-00240 NDTX (e.g., Transcript of Proceedings 8/8/07, at 24, 131 (objec-
tions to government translations, government stated ‘‘Islamists’’ for years, until defense
counsel pointed out it should say ‘‘Muslims’’) (on file with author); U.S. v. Aref 1:04-cr-
00402 NDNY (e.g., Transcript of Proceedings 8/22/06 at 19 (Pretrial Conference 5) and
Trial Tr. 9/20/06 at 997 (government has translated a word as ‘‘commander’’ when it means
‘‘brother’’)).
117. U.S. v. Aref, id.; U.S. v. Warsame, transcript of sentencing, supra not 43, at 8.
118. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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limited to statements of witnesses and not of individuals who will never
testify at trial.119
In treating as classified evidence obtained from foreign sources, as well as
background material related to those sources, and in protecting government
classification decisions in spite of the hurdles it poses for cross-examination,
judges are simply acting on well-established evidentiary principles that pri-
oritize national security over the reliability of evidence presented against
defendants. In fact, it appears that in no case or statute has a determination
ever been made that reliable verdicts require otherwise.
The breadth of eavesdropping authorized under § 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended by the FISA Amendments Act of
2008,120 may bring issues of classified information into more conventional
criminal cases. Moreover, at least one prominent defense attorney has
pointed to the use of ‘‘parallel construction’’ of information as a threat to
traditional guarantees of due process.121 Through parallel construction, law
enforcement agents may hide the influence of information gathered via
FISA (and therefore classified) by constructing a pretextual case by which
to prosecute the defendant. The process is similar to pretext searches in the
criminal context: having been alerted to suspected criminal activity
(through FISA wiretaps), the NSA alerts local law enforcement to their
suspicion regarding a particular individual. Local law enforcement then
creates a pretext to engage in criminal investigation of that individual,
possibly by means as simple as finding an excuse to pull a car over on the
highway and search the car.122
Even here, the precursors of the practice are clearly evident in the use of
pretext to stop, search, arrest, and prosecute criminal suspects. In the early
years following the 2001 attacks, the use of pretextual prosecution was often
remarked upon as a striking development in the area of counterterror
119. Id.; see also statements of Joshua Dratel and Leonie M. Brinkema, Symposium, Trial
& Terrorism: The Implications of Trying National Security Cases in Article III Courts, 2015 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y, taped proceedings available at http://jnslp.com/symposium/.
120. Pub. L. 110–261, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008).
121. Statement of Joshua Dratel, Symposium, Trial & Terrorism: The Implications of
Trying National Security Cases in Article III Courts, 2015 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y, taped
proceedings available at http://jnslp.com/symposium/.
122. Id.; John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up
program used to investigate Americans, Reuters, Aug. 5, 2013, http://mobile.reuters.com/
article/idUSBRE97409R20130805.
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policy among those who seem to neglect its long history both in and out of
counterterrorism,123 or among those who are aware that it was used prior
to 2001 but believe that there was a sudden and marked increase in the
years following 2001.124 But the very fact that pretextual prosecution is
often referred to as ‘‘Al Capone policing’’125 suggests its long and storied
history, both inside the terrorism context and out.
Pretextual prosecution is the practice of prosecuting a suspect for any
crime law enforcement feels they can prove, rather than the crime law
enforcement is actually concerned about. In this manner, persons sus-
pected of, for instance, terror financing, may be incarcerated based on
proof that they misfiled federal forms, or that they hid the nature of the
organization they were funding. Similarly, immigration violations, such as
working while on a student visa, enable the government to deport suspects
with no discussion of terrorism whatsoever. As John Ashcroft stated, ‘‘Let
the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa—even by one
day—we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and
kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We
will seek every prosecutorial advantage.’’126
But although pretextual prosecution received renewed attention in the
wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, its standing as an established tool of law
enforcement prior to 2001 is unquestionable. Due in part to the steady
increase in criminalization, prosecutors often have not only a range of
criminal violations to choose from in selecting charges, but also an impos-
sibly large range of possible defendants. Indeed, prosecutors are overrun
with possible cases, and are given the discretion to choose which cases to
pursue and which to dismiss.127 The ability to choose from a large number
of possible defendants not only allows for the use of discretion to pursue
those suspects believed to be most dangerous, it encourages such choices.
123. Chesney, supra note 11.
124. Cole, supra note 11; COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 14; CHRISTOPHER SHIELDS,
KELLY DAMPHOUSSE, & BRENT SMITH, HOW 9/11 CHANGED THE PROSECUTION OF
TERRORISM (2009).
125. Daniel Richman & William Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution 105 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583 (2005); Harry Litman, Pre-
textual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 92 1135 (2003).
126. John Ashcroft, Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Plan, Sept. 17, 2001.
127. Litman, supra note 125; William Stuntz, The pathological politics of criminal law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
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This mean that prosecutors, confronted with a dilemma about whom to
pursue amongst a large selection of defendants who have engaged in similar
levels of criminality, will make their decisions based on factors other than
the particular crime to be charged. This may include repeat offenders,
defendants believed to have valuable information about other suspects,
or unprovable but compelling beliefs that the individual defendant is
dangerous in a way that is larger than the particular crime for which the
prosecutor has proof.128
Most likely this strategy presents itself most often in the discretionary
decisions of individual prosecutors in individual cases. However, Harry
Litman has identified a number of varied types of crimes and social sce-
narios that have given rise to broad policies of pretextual prosecution in
recent years. These have ranged from the increased use of drug and gun
possession charges, trespassing and public intoxication charges, and parole
enforcement against repeat violent offenders in order to reduce violent
crime in times of perceived crisis, to the blatant use of drug prosecutions
in order to incarcerate a suspected murderer when it seemed that trying
him for murder would be unsuccessful.129
The use of pretextual prosecution against suspected terrorists was also
well established prior to 2001. Indeed, the case of the LA 8 (seven Pales-
tinian men and a Kenyan woman, whom the FBI believed to be associ-
ated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) dates to 1987
and resulted in the revelation that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service was encouraging a policy of utilizing technical and other immigra-
tion violations pretextually to deport immigrants suspected of association
with terrorist groups. This was part of a larger policy of ‘‘disruption,’’ that
is, pretextual prosecution. FBI policy at the time was to identify persons
believed to be associated with terrorist groups and find crimes to charge
them with, in order to incarcerate, deport, or otherwise incapacitate and
disrupt possible plans.130
Using pretext to disrupt and create ‘‘clean’’ prosecutions, as Joshua Dratel
complains, blocks defense attorneys from examining the information on
128. Litman, supra note 125; see also Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal
Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 573 (1999); David Kennedy,
Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VALP.
L. REV. 449 (1997).
129. Litman, supra note 125; see also Kennedy, supra note 128.
130. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 14.
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which searches were based originally.131 One doubts, for instance, that Al
Capone would have been entitled to the basis for the government’s suspicion
of his organized criminal activity, were he prosecuted solely for tax evasion
through legitimate businesses. Similarly, it is unimaginable that prosecutors
routinely disclose evidence of their police officers’ racial bias (the true reason
for suspicion in many pretext highway stops), given the Supreme Court’s
consistent determinations that the actual reason for a stop is irrelevant, if
sufficient probable cause of criminal activity exists.132
In such circumstances, then, we see once again the extreme, slippery-
slope results of the small holes in due process protections that were estab-
lished long prior to, and in many cases entirely independent of, the threat
of terrorism. Although the threat of terrorism highlights these issues, it
most certainly did not create them.
CONCLUS ION
In response to criticism of law enforcement tactics used in the immediate
wake of the September 11th attacks, defenders of the Department of Justice
insisted that a new approach to law enforcement was necessary to deal
with the threat of terrorism.133 Criminal justice, it was asserted, had been
‘‘reactive’’ until 2001; post-September 11th, criminal justice had to become
‘‘preventative.’’134
Yet examples of these ‘‘new’’ preventative measures bear a striking
resemblance to lawful measures already long in place. Criminalizing asso-
ciation, often warned against as one of the most fundamental changes to
131. Dratel, supra note 121.
132. See, e.g., Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (finding subjective intent is irrelevant to
the propriety of a traffic stop if police had probable cause to stop the defendant); Al-Kidd v.
Ashcroft, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2081 (2011) (‘‘we have almost uniformly rejected invitations to
probe subjective intent’’); David Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case
Study of the New Federalism in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367
(2001).
133. Ashcroft, supra note 126; John Ashcroft, Memorandum to Heads of the Compo-
nents of the Department of Justice, Nov. 8, 2001; Viet Dinh, Harold Leventhal Talk:
Ordered Liberty in the Age of International Terrorism (n.d.), http://www.dcbar.org/for_
lawyers/sections/administrative_law_and_agency_practice/dinh.cfm.
134. Id.
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criminal law,135 was in fact more extreme in pre-2001 versions of antiterror
legislation (§ 2339A and B) than it was after modifications made in case law
and through amendments leading up to and after 2001.136 The use of
SAMs to detain suspects in solitary confinement pre-conviction, and even
many of the ‘‘new’’ powers of surveillance, were created or (in the case of
surveillance) developed in case law and law enforcement practice several
years before the attacks.
Of all of the supposedly ‘‘new’’ tactics used in the criminal justice system
to pursue terrorists, only the collection of electronic and telephonic content
of conversations is a true change from prior practice, and this change has
not proceeded unchallenged. Instead, argument continues at the legislative,
judicial, and executing levels of government, as well as in the public debate.
Rather than rolling over in the face of an emergency, then, the democratic
process appears to be in full gear in response to these new law enforcement
tactics.
This contextual analysis not only shows the consistency of post-2001
policy with pre-2001 criminal justice, it suggests that these criminal justice
norms influenced broader U.S. policy, and expands our understanding of
how those criminal justice norms were developing in the late twentieth
century. It calls attention to the fact that the available tools will be used to
their limits, reminding us that the slippery slope does exist and is a force to
be reckoned with. Institutional pressures in law enforcement encourage the
progressively more broad, extreme, and imaginative use of any powers
available. These pressures and the law enforcement response thereto require
no added stimulus from ‘‘new’’ threats or public panics—or, if those threats
and panics are necessary, they appear to have been present long before the
terror ‘‘crisis’’ appeared. Far from a brand new response to a brand new
threat, U.S. counterterror policy post-2001 came directly from the technol-
ogies and practices of crime control that had been largely already developed.
The above suggests we shouldn’t be shocked by post-2001 tactics. More
importantly, it suggests how pre-2001 law enforcement tactics allowed for,
encouraged, and shaped the post-2001 ‘‘abuses’’ that are the subject of so
much concern.
The myth of the Rule of Law is that law moves slowly, acting as
a progressive force when logic and reasoning prove the faults in basic
135. Chesney, supra note 11; COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 14.
136. See Section II.A, supra; see also Peterson, supra note 20.
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cultural assumptions that influence lawmakers, and acting as a calming
force when general panic and strong emotions cause the public to seek
sudden and unreasonable change. This check on public emotions is meant
to work through legal socialization, where the legal reasoning and meth-
odologies that have been taught to judges and attorneys over decades might
overtake the general panic of the day. This socialization and cultural edu-
cation takes place as well in legal institutions, where the legal imagination
becomes limited to institutionally accepted practices.
Although current counterterror practices in the criminal justice system
might hardly be described as restrained, this limitation on the legal imag-
ination appears to have been well in place over the course of the past fifteen
years. Despite political arguments that the threat of terrorism had moved
beyond the legal realm, and could not be addressed even by the laws of war,
when faced with such an unfamiliar threat, U.S. policy makers defaulted to
practices, and defenses of those practices, that had been used for decades. In
those areas where they stepped outside of accepted practices, they quickly
(and perhaps somewhat desperately) endeavored to find their way back
within well-understood legal norms.
This fact does not excuse current legal activities, or render them harm-
less. Instead it should serve as a reminder that the limits of law enforcement
activity must be carefully guarded, and it highlights the holes and openings
that were granted in criminal constitutional doctrine long before the terror
threat became a focus of discussion. As we can see, for instance, in the
increasing number of articles written on the flaws of the Third Party
Doctrine, the threat of terrorism and increasing use of these loopholes in
response may be a blessing in disguise—finally focusing public and schol-
arly attention on the extreme levels to which these exceptions had risen.
Indeed, if we are lucky, this ‘‘panic’’ may yet serve to stimulate real change
in criminal procedure, forcing legal actors to remedy the flaws that have
festered quietly over the past several decades.
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